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The Global Positioning System (GPS), a satellite navigation system, is 
critical to the United States’ national and homeland security. The U.S. has made 
GPS resilient to interruption by flying more satellites than required, dispersing its 
infrastructure, and increasing its signals. Despite these efforts, there is concern 
the U.S. may not be able to overcome disturbances in GPS’s operations. 
Limitations in GPS data and the policy literature prevent the full quantification of 
exactly how vulnerable GPS is to service interruption.  
This thesis used constant comparison analysis to examine how a shift in 
conceptual lens from viewing GPS as public utility to viewing it as a software 
platform has changed our understanding of its criticality, resilience, and 
vulnerability. This methodology overcomes research limitations by using GPS 
system design, operations, and policies as its data sources. The public utility lens 
reveals the U.S. has increased GPS resilience through system design and 
redundancies. The software platform lens shows the U.S. further increased GPS 
resilience by adding navigation signals. Together, the lenses indicate 
manufacturers, applications developers, and users are constraints to increasing 
GPS’s resilience. Additional data, models, and research are required to inform 
policies and decisions to further improve GPS’s resilience.  
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The United States considers the Global Positioning System (GPS), a 
satellite radio navigation system, to be vital to its national and homeland security. 
America’s military and critical infrastructures sectors rely on GPS for their 
operations.1 The U.S. has made GPS extremely resistant to intentional and 
natural interference by placing its satellites in orbits beyond the reach of most 
anti-satellite weapons, flying significantly more satellites than required, and 
broadcasting multiple signals.2 Despite these safeguards, the U.S. government 
has acknowledged the need to preserve and increase its GPS backups.3 This 
begs the questions of: Why? And should more be done to address GPS’s 
vulnerabilities? 
The U.S. government faces several major challenges in determining if it 
has sufficient GPS backups. It does not strictly regulate, monitor, or keep 
statistics on how GPS is used.4 It has terminated the operations of radio 
navigation systems that could have complemented or served as GPS backup. 
1 White House, NSPD-39: U.S. Space-Based Position, Navigation, and Timing Policy Fact 
Sheet (Washington, DC: White House, 2004), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-39.htm.  
2 Jaganath Sanakran, “Debating Space Security: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities” (PhD diss., 
University of Maryland, 2012), http://cissmdev.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/default/files/
papers/sankaran_debating_space_securitycapbilities_and_vulnerabilities.pdf, 78–92; Geoffrey 
Forden, “Viewpoint: China and Space War,” Astropolitics 6, no. 2 (2008): 138–153; National 
Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, “The Global Positioning 
System,” accessed July 13, 2015, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/; National Coordination Office 
for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing, “GPS Modernization,” last modified April 26, 
2016, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/modernization/; National Coordination Office for Space-
Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing, “New Civil Signals,” last modified August 12, 2016, 
http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/modernization/civilsignals/.  
3 White House, NSPD-39; U.S. Department of Defense [DOD], U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security [DHS], and U.S. Department of Transportation [DOT], 2014 Federal Radio 
Navigation Plan (Washington DC: National Technical Information Service, 2015), 
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/FederalRadio NavigationPlan2014.pdf, 3–5.  
4 The U.S.’ only restrictions on GPS are nation security related. In plain terms, GPS receivers 
or components with the following characteristics are subject to U.S. import and export laws: use 
military GPS signals, operate with anti-jamming antennas, operate on large drones, rockets, and 
missiles.  
U.S.C., Title 22, ch. 1, subch. M, § 121.1, http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?SID=86008bdffd1fb2e79cc5df41a180750a&node=22:1.0.1.13.58&rgn=div5. 
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Moreover, many U.S. industries and individual users do not have 
the infrastructures, backup devices, and processes to operate effectively 
and efficiently during a GPS outage.5 Finally, the social science and policy 
analysis communities have not carried out sustained theory based research 
on GPS. Collectively, these factors limit the U.S.’ ability to effectively identify 
and address all of GPS’s vulnerabilities.  
This thesis investigated why GPS’s vulnerabilities have been an ongoing 
policy issue. It did so by examining how a shift in a conceptual lens from viewing 
GPS public utility to one of viewing it as a software platform changed our 
understanding of its criticality, resilience, and vulnerability. The public utility lens 
frames the role of GPS as a provider of critical navigation signals to its users 
while the software platform lens depicts the role of GPS as technology that 
serves a foundation or input on which new technologies and processes are built 
upon. Together, these two lenses describe GPS’s full range of use. 
Constant comparison analysis was used to examine GPS’s roles as both a 
public utility and software platform. This application of constant comparison 
analysis assumed GPS salient characteristics reflect the goals and objectives of 
those who built, operate, and maintain it. Therefore, examination of the GPS 
system and the laws, polices, and practices that govern it operations can provide 
insights on its role as public utility and software platform. Furthermore, the 
constant comparison method does require quantitative data and a significant 
research literature. In other words, it allowed us to analyze GPS by using what is 
already known to about GPS and the policies that govern its operation.  
The public utility lens revealed the U.S. uses system design and physical 
redundancies to increase GPS’s resilience. It showed that every individual GPS 
satellite and ground facility contributes to the global production and transmission 
of navigation signals. This approach has increased GPS’s resilience by reducing 
the criticality of every satellite and ground facility. Furthermore, it indicates the 
5 DOD, DHS, and DOT, 2014 Federal Radio Navigation Plan, 5-4–5-8. 
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U.S. has further reduced criticality of these infrastructures by adding more 
satellites and ground facilities than what is required to meet minimum system 
performance requirements. Together, system design and redundancies have 
reduced GPS’s vulnerability to major service interruptions.  
The software platforms lens indicated the U.S. has further increased GPS 
resilience by treating it like an open source computer operating system instead of 
a software platform. Specifically, the U.S. does not actively manage the 
relationships between GPS satellite system, the technologies and process that 
complement it, and the interfaces controlling the relationships between these two 
platform elements. Rather, it has focused its efforts on improving the GPS 
resilience by maintaining existing signals while as the same time adding new 
ones to GPS operations. This has three major benefits. One, it has allowed GPS 
to continue providing its signal to existing GPS receivers. Two, it has provided 
GPS manufactures and applications developers with the opportunity to create 
more reliable, accurate, and resilient receivers and processes that use old and 
new GPS signals in their operations. However, there is no guarantee they will 
pursue this opportunity. Three, the additional new signals transform the existing 
GPS system into the functional equivalent of multiple satellite systems.  
There are two major limitations of this thesis and the ongoing GPS policy 
discussions on GPS vulnerabilities. One, the lack of sustained theory based 
policy research on GPS has limited the development of overarching frameworks 
that can be used evaluate how political, economic, and social factors have 
influenced its technological development. Future GPS policy research based on 
the social construction of technology theory could provide us with concepts and 
methodologies to begin overcoming this analytical challenge. Two, a lack of 
statistical data on the number and types of GPS in operation has limited our 
ability to develop estimate how vulnerable GPS users actually are to service 
interruptions. Long-term data collections efforts, such as periodic market 
research and surveys, could provide use with the data necessary to develop 
models and metrics to analyze how America’s GPS use and vulnerabilities are 
xviii 
changing over time. The knowledge gained from these efforts can help inform the 
public debate on GPS’s vulnerabilities and future policy decisions that will be 
required to address them.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The United States (U.S.) considers the Global Positioning System (GPS), 
a satellite radio navigation system, to be vital to its national and homeland 
security.1 America’s military and critical infrastructures sectors rely on GPS for 
their operations. The U.S. has made GPS extremely resistant to intentional and 
natural interference by placing its satellites in orbits beyond the reach of most 
anti-satellite weapons, flying significantly more satellites than required, and 
broadcasting multiple signals.2 Theoretically, major wars with space combat, 
targeted attacks against critical sub-systems, or extreme space weather are the 
only major occurrences that could interrupt GPS’s operation for an extended 
period of time. Despite these safeguards, the U.S. government has 
acknowledged the need to preserve and increase its GPS backups.3 This begs 
the questions of: Why? And should more be done to address GPS’s 
vulnerabilities? 
                                            
1 White House, NSPD-39: U.S. Space-Based Position, Navigation, and Timing Policy Fact 
Sheet (Washington, DC: White House, 2004), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-39.htm.  
2 Jaganath Sanakran, “Debating Space Security: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities” (PhD diss., 
University of Maryland, 2012), http://cissmdev.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/default/files/
papers/sankaran_debating_space_securitycapbilities_and_vulnerabilities.pdf, 78–92; Geoffrey 
Forden, “Viewpoint: China and Space War,” Astropolitics 6, no. 2 (2008): 138–153; National 
Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing [National Coordination 
Office], “The Global Positioning System,” last modified February 11, 2014, http://www.gps.gov/
systems/gps/; National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing 
[National Coordination Office], “GPS Modernization,” last modified April 26, 2016, 
http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/modernization/; National Coordination Office for Space-Based 
Positioning, Navigation and Timing, “New Civil Signals,” last modified August 12, 2016, 
http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/modernization/civilsignals/. 
3 White House, NSPD-39; White House, National Space Policy of United States (Washington 
DC: White House, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-
28-10.pdf, 5; U.S. Department of Defense [DOD], U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 
and U.S. Department of Transportation [DOT], 2014 Federal Radio Navigation Plan (Washington 
DC: National Technical Information Service, 2015), http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/FederalRadio 
NavigationPlan2014.pdf, 3-5.  
 2 
Current U.S. government policy contends existing industry backup 
systems and procedures are sufficient to address a GPS disruption.4 The U.S. 
National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board, 
research organizations, and non-profit institutions have quietly argued this may 
not be the case.5 To save money, the U.S. government has terminated the 
operation of federally funded navigation systems that could complement or 
backup the GPS system. Localized GPS disruptions, such as the U.S. Navy’s 
accidental jamming of GPS signal in San Diego, California and the use of 
personal GPS jamming devices in the vicinity of New Jersey’s Newark 
International Airport, have caused failures in air traffic control, communications, 
maritime security, and navigation systems.6 These failures clearly call into 
question the adequacy of existing GPS backups. There are concerns the U.S. is 
becoming increasingly overly reliant on GPS, existing GPS backups may not be 
adequate, and the associated risks of a GPS disruption are not acceptable.  
To complicate matters further, there is wide variation in how different 
industries use and backup GPS. Some industries, such as commercial aviation 
and marine shipping, have supporting infrastructures, backup devices, and 
processes allowing them to continuing operating during a GPS outage.7 
However, there are many economic sectors that do not have these safeguards in 
place. Some industries, such as commercial surveying, precision farming, and oil 
                                            
4 “Record of Decision (ROD) on the U.S. Coast Guard Long Range Aids to Navigation 
(Loran-C) Program,” Federal Register 75, no. 4 (January 7, 2010): 997–998; “Terminate Long 
Range Aids to Navigation (Loran-C) Signal (Notice),” Federal Register 5, no. 4 (January 7, 2010): 
998. 
5 Bradford Parkinson et al., Independent Assessment Team (IAT) Summary of Initial Findings 
on eLoran (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2009); National Space-Based 
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board [PNT], Jamming the Global Positioning 
System—A National Security Threat: Recent Events and Potential Cures (Washington, DC: 
National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board, 2010); Royal 
Academy of Engineering, Global Navigation Space Systems: Reliance and Vulnerabilities 
(London, UK: Royal Academy of Engineering, 2011); Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, 
“What We Do,” 2015, http://rntfnd.org/what-we-do/. 
6 Parkinson et al., Independent Assessment Team, A2–A3; PNT, Jamming the Global 
Positioning System, 4–5.  
7 DOD, DHS, and DOT, 2014 Federal Radio Navigation Plan, 5-4–5-8.  
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drilling, most likely will lose the GPS related efficiency and safety benefits during 
a service disruption.8 Finally, some industries and firms, such as those providing 
on demand transportation services and vehicle tracking, may simply cease 
operations because their business processes are based on GPS’s constant 
availability and they do not have backups.9 
Furthermore, America does not truly know the full extent of GPS’s use and 
its associated vulnerabilities, nor does it strictly regulate, monitor, or keep 
statistics on how GPS is used.10 Instead, it has encouraged GPS’s adoption of 
freely sharing civil GPS civil specifications and signals.11 Manufacturers and 
software developers are free to develop civil GPS related products and services. 
Firms and individuals are free to determine how they will incorporate GPS into 
their products, processes, and daily activities. GPS, as a result of these polices, 
has expanded beyond navigation to include virtually every economic sector and 
activity using information technology. Unfortunately, the U.S. cannot effectively 
address GPS’s vulnerabilities without taking into account the scope and scale of 
its use.  
Finally, the social science and policy research communities have not 
made GPS a focus of sustained theory based research. The majority of policy 
research establishing America’s GPS policy was conducted between 1970 and 
1995. Since then, the publicly available policy literature has narrowly focused on 
describing GPS’s importance to the public and/or analyzing individual GPS policy 
decisions and their outcomes. The GPS policy literature does not systematically 
                                            
8 Ibid., 5-8.  
9 Ibid.  
10 The U.S.’ only restrictions on GPS are nation security related. In plain terms, GPS 
receivers or components with the following characteristics are subject to U.S. import and export 
laws: use military GPS signals, operate with anti-jamming antennas, operate on large drones, 
rockets and missiles. U.S.C. Title 22, ch. 1, subch. M, § 121.1, http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?SID=86008bdffd1fb2e79cc5df41a180750a&node=22:1.0.1.13.58&rgn=div5.  
11 National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing, 
“Technical Documentation,” last modified July 1, 2016, http://www.gps.gov/technical/.  
10 U.S.C. § 2281, http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-
section2281&num=0&edition=prelim.  
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account for the myriad of political, economic, sociological, and technological 
changes that have occurred since 1995. As a result, there is not one overarching 
theoretical or conceptual framework that accounts for the myriad of roles GPS 
plays in today’s world. These shortcomings limit the U.S. government’s ability to 
effectively address GPS’s vulnerabilities.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
This thesis seeks to gain a better understanding of why GPS’s 
vulnerabilities have been an enduring U.S. public policy concern. It does so by 
answering the following research question: How does a shift in conceptual lenses 
from viewing GPS as a public utility to that of a software platform change our 
understanding of its criticality, resilience, and vulnerability? 
Together, these conceptual lenses provide two perspectives to describe 
GPS’s full range of uses. The public utility lens focuses on how GPS delivers its 
signals to its users. Conversely, the software platform conceptual lens examines 
how nations, organizations, and individuals use GPS as a technological 
foundation for products and services. Moreover, the use of this conceptual lens 
allows us to address this thesis’s two major research challenges: lack of 
statistical data and limited policy literature.  
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
A constant comparison research methodology will be used to examine 
GPS’s role as public utility and a software platform. This research  
strategy involves taking one piece of data (one interview, one 
statement, one theme) and comparing it to all others that may be 
similar or different in order to develop conceptualizations of the 
possible relations between the various pieces of data.12  
It is a useful approach for conducting research on human phenomena for which 
there is limited research and data. It assumes “fundamental social processes 
                                            
12 Sally Thorne, “Data Analysis in Qualitative Research,” Evidence-Based Nursing 3, no. 3 
(2000): 69.   
 5 
explain something about human behavior and experience.”13 In plain terms, it 
asserts that knowledge, insights, and theory about a social outcome can be 
developed by observing and analyzing the human systems and activities that 
produce them.  
1. Research Significance  
By extension, the constant comparison method can provide new 
knowledge on the nature of GPS’s criticality, resilience, and vulnerabilities. 
GPS’s salient characteristics, like those of all man-made systems, are a 
reflection of the goals and objectives of those who have and operate it. 
Therefore, constant comparison analysis can potentially provide us new GPS 
insights by examining the relationships between how the GPS system functions 
and the policies and rules governing its operations. Specifically, by evaluating 
GPS’s roles as a public utility and a software platform, it can provide us with a 
more holistic view of these relationships.  
2. GPS as a Public Utility  
The public utility lens focuses on GPS’s role as a government regulated 
enterprise that operates and maintains a physical infrastructure for the purpose 
of producing and delivering an essential good or service to its customers.14 A 
public utility is often the sole provider of a vital good or service for its customers. 
Therefore, it is critical that a public utility provide its users with extremely reliable 
service. The failure or degradation in a public utility’s performance will most likely 
have significant negative impacts on the organizations and individuals who 
directly and indirectly rely on it.  
                                            
13 Ibid.  
14 James C. Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Rates (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1961), http://media.terry.uga.edu/documents/exec_ed/bonbright/
principles_of_public_utility_rates.pdf, 3; John Black, ed., Oxford Dictionary of Economics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 380; Rick Geddes, “Public Utilities,” in The Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economic, ed. Boudewijn Bouchaert and Gerrit De Gest, 1163–1164 (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2000), http://www.human.cornell.edu/pam/cpip/upload/RRg-bookchapter-Public-
Utilities.pdf. 
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The U.S. has characterized GPS as a global information utility that 
provides signals to GPS users throughout the world.15 Many nations rely on GPS 
for the operations of their military and their civilian infrastructures. A failure of 
degradation in GPS’s performance could have significant and widespread 
international and domestic impacts. Specifically, it could undermine U.S. and 
allied military operations, trigger economic losses, and lead to accidents, deaths, 
and property damages that otherwise would not occur.  
America, like a public utility operator, has taken significant steps to 
prevent and mitigate the consequences of a service disruption. It has in orbit at 
least 31 active and reserve GPS satellites—30 percent more satellites than the 
24 required for global coverage.16 The U.S. has increased the number of civil and 
military GPS signals, reducing the potential that atmospheric condition, extreme 
space weather, and intentional interference (jamming and false broadcasts) 
could degrade GPS’s accuracy and reliability.17 Finally, it operates and maintains 
a globally dispersed infrastructure to monitor and correct GPS’s operational 
performance.18 
3. GPS as a Software Platform 
The software platform conceptual lens recognizes that GPS’s uses have 
moved far beyond positioning, navigation, and timing. A software platform is a 
technology that uses written language or code to create value by providing 
services to multiple and distinct groups of application developers, hardware 
                                            
15 White House, NSPD-39.  
16 National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing 
[National Coordination Office], “Space Segment,” last modified March 9, 2016, 
http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/control/#modernization.  
17 National Coordination Office, “GPS Modernization.”  
18 National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing 
[National Coordination Office], “Control Segment,” last modified April 13, 2016, 
http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/control/#modernization.  
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manufacturers, and users.19 They are able to do this because once their codes 
are developed, they can at very little cost and effort and easily be reused and/or 
modified to operate with other technologies and processes.20 As a result, they 
can become “a base upon which other applications, processes or technologies 
are developed.”21 
In its desire to promote GPS’s adoption and continued use, the United 
States has implemented a range of policies and laws that have in effect 
transformed GPS from a navigation system to a software platform. It continuously 
and globally broadcasts GPS signals from space to Earth free of charge,22 And 
anyone who has a GPS receiver can utilize the GPS signal. It has made many of 
GPS civil specifications publicly available.23 Manufacturers and application 
developers can use them to create new products and services without paying for 
GPS’s technical specifications and signals. Finally, to keep GPS as the world’s 
premier global satellite navigation system,24 America has added more satellite 
and signals to the GPS system.25  
                                            
19 David S. Evans, Andrei Hagiu, and Richard Schmalensee, Invisible Engines: How 
Software Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008), 
Kindle edition, Kindle locations 78–97.  
20 Ibid., Kindle location 115.  
21 Technopedia, s.v. “Platform,” accessed February 14, 2016, https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/3411/platform.  
22 National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing 
[National Coordination Office], “United States Policy,” last modified July 1, 2016, 
http://www.gps.gov/policy/.  
23 National Coordination Office, “Technical Documentation.”  
24 European Space Agency, “Galileo Future and Evolutions,” last modified April 24 2013, 
Navipedia, accessed September 12, 2016, http://www.navipedia.org/index.php/
Galileo_Future_and_Evolutions. There are currently two fully operational global satellite 
navigation systems: the U.S. GPS system and Russia’s GLONASS. The European Union is 
currently developing its Galileo satellite navigation system, which is scheduled to be completed in 
2020.  
China is also developing its Beidou2 satellite navigation system, which is also scheduled to 
become fully operational in 2020. European Space Agency, “BeiDou Future and Evolutions,” last 
modified August 5 2016, Navipedia, accessed September 12, 2016, http://www.navipedia.org/
index.php/BeiDou_Future_and_Evolutions.  
25 National Coordination Office, “United States Policy.”   
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The collective result of these policies is that the U.S. government has 
become the GPS software platform owner or keystone firm for many of the 
world’s industries and companies. A platform owner/keystone firm is the one that 
controls how applications operate and interface with the main software.26 In this 
role, the U.S. provides the GPS core functionality, which is the provision of civil 
and military signals. These signals are used for positioning, navigation, and 
timing. It also controls GPS technical specifications and system operations, 
which determine how manufacturers, application developers, and users 
incorporate GPS in their products, services and activities. 
Furthermore, as a result of American policies, GPS has become a 
keystone firm in many well established industries, corporations, and their 
associated technologies and processes. For instance, the U.S. military uses GPS 
in its navigation, logistics, communications, intelligence, and weapons systems. 
Major communication providers (e.g., AT&T and Verizon) and public utilities (e.g., 
electricity companies) use GPS’s timing signals to help manage and route the 
flow of transmission through their respective systems. Software developers (e.g., 
Apple, Google and Waze) use GPS to facilitate the development of new 
applications to make their products and services more attractive to existing and 
potential customers. GPS’s widespread use means that many economic sectors 
and activities could be negatively impacted should an outage occur. 
D. SELECTION 
There are two major factors that determine the scale, scope, and nature of 
GPS’s criticality, resilience, and vulnerabilities. The first is simply the law of 
physics. GPS operates by broadcasting low-powered signals that are extremely 
susceptible to disruption from atmospheric conditions, electronic jamming, and 
                                            
26 Amrit Tiwana, Platform Ecosystem Aligning Architecture, Governance, and Strategy 
(Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 2014), 5. 
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false broadcasts.27 The second factor is how the U.S. has designed, operated, 
and managed GPS. Each of these factors has different research implications.  
By themselves, GPS’s low-powered signals provide limited explanation for 
why GPS’s vulnerabilities have been an ongoing U.S. policy issue. The laws of 
nature governing how GPS operates are constant. In other words, GPS’s low 
signal power has and will continue to be a source of GPS vulnerabilities. 
Although important, it provides limited insight as to why GPS vulnerabilities have 
been a long-term policy issue. 
GPS’s design, operation, and management may have strong explanatory 
power on why its vulnerabilities have been a persistent public policy concern. 
These system characteristics are a reflection of the goals and objectives America 
hopes to achieve by providing GPS globally and free of charge. Through GPS’s 
design and operations, the United States has determined who can use the 
system and how it is used. There have been changes in these parameters over 
the course of GPS’s history. Each of these changes may have increased, 
decreased, or had no impact on the scale, scope, and the potential 
consequences of GPS’s vulnerabilities. Examining these changes through a 
public utility and software platform lens may provide us with broader and deeper 
insights on GPS’s criticality, resilience, and vulnerabilities.  
1. Data 
The primary sources of data for this analysis will be GPS’s policies, its 
operational systems, and its existing policy literature. The U.S.’ policy goals, 
laws, regulations, and practices determine who uses GPS and how they use it. 
America’s design, operations, and management of GPS systems not only reflect 
these factors but also exert a strong influence on GPS’s criticality, resilience, and 
vulnerabilities. Finally, the existing GPS policy literature, which consists of 
presidential directives, U.S. laws and research reports, provides the background, 
                                            
27 PNT, Jamming the Global Positioning System, 3–6; Mark Goldstein and Joseph 
Kirschbaum, GPS Disruptions: Efforts to Assess Risks to Critical Infrastructure and Coordinate 
Agency Actions Should Be Enhanced (Washington DC: General Accountability Office, 2013), 10. 
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rationale, and an analysis necessary to understand how GPS has evolved over 
time. Together, these three different data sources can provide the information to 
evaluate GPS from the perspectives of it being a public utility and a software 
platform.  
2. Outputs 
The primary output of this research is the analysis of GPS as a public 
utility and as a software platform. Together, these two lenses may provide 
insights about GPS’s criticality, resilience, and vulnerability that might not 
otherwise be recognized. Furthermore, each lens can extend the public utility and 
software platform research literatures to study GPS. This in turn can contribute to 
the development of conceptual frameworks that can be used to evaluate GPS 
and inform policy decision. Moreover, these two lenses can provide the insights 
required to make real-world GPS decisions, while at the same time using the 
discipline of scientific method to more fully understand GPS. Finally, it will help 
decision makers, analysts, scientists, and scholars to directly tie basic research 
back to GPS policy.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter reviews and assesses the existing GPS literature to better 
understand why GPS’s vulnerabilities have been a persistent U.S. national and 
homeland security issue. The social science and policy research communities 
have not made GPS a focus of sustained theory based research. As a result, 
there is not a GPS specific theoretical or conceptual framework to evaluate GPS 
and its vulnerabilities. 
A. THEMES IN LITERATURE ABOUT GPS’S ROLES 
Despite this limitation, there are three broad themes within the reviewed 
literature that can be used to help structure policy analysis on GPS’s 
vulnerabilities. Each theme assumes GPS serves national goals beyond its 
primary purpose of providing its users with a signal. The first theme considers 
GPS as a tool the U.S. has used to reduce the cost of operating and maintaining 
its federal radio navigation system. The second theme asserts GPS has become 
an element of America’s foreign, national security, and economic policies. The 
third theme warns that from the perspectives of some in the military, 
transportation, and scientific communities, GPS is more vulnerable than 
commonly believed. These themes individually and collectively provide insight on 
why GPS vulnerabilities have been an enduring U.S. public policy concern. 
1. GPS is a Management Tool  
The U.S. government has historically treated GPS as a management tool 
it could use to reduce the number of federal navigation systems and their total 
budgetary costs. This trend manifested itself in 1973 when the Department of 
Defense (DOD) created the GPS program by merging two satellite development 
programs.28 Cost was a major reason for this consolidation. DOD did not believe 
                                            
28 Bradford Parkinson and Stephen Gilbert, “NAVSTAR: Global Positioning System-Ten 
Years Later,” Proceedings of the IEEE 71, no. 10 (1983): 1177.   
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it could afford to “develop, deploy, and operate” two separate systems serving a 
common navigational purpose.29  
GPS’s creation is indicative of a larger trend to minimize federal radio 
navigation costs through consolidation. The U.S. president, Congress, and 
General Accounting Office (GAO) expressed a desire to reduce the cost of its 
federal radio navigation budget. GAO noted in a 1974 report that individuals in 
government and industry were concerned there was a “proliferation of federal 
radio navigation systems whose mounting costs must be borne by Government 
and users alike.”30 Therefore, GAO called for a “national plan for navigation” to 
achieve the minimum of navigation systems to meet long-range military and civil 
air, land, and sea navigation requirements.31  
In a 1978 report, the GAO again expressed concern about the number 
and cost of federal radio navigation systems. It concluded there was a 
“proliferation of overlapping navigation systems with significantly higher cost to 
the Government and users.”32 Therefore, GAO called for a government-wide 
plan to address this concern.33 Furthermore, GAO recommended the president 
appoint a manager who had the authority and budgetary control to implement this 
navigation plan. Finally, GAO suggested the GPS system, which was under 
development at the time, take into account civil (non-military) requirements and 
be used to reduce the number of federally provided navigation systems.34 
Congress responded to this report by including in the International Maritime 
Satellite Communications Act of 1978 a requirement the president produce a 
                                            
29 Ibid. 
30 Elmer Staats, Report to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries United States House of Representatives. Summary of GAO Study 
of Radio Navigation Systems: Meeting Maritime Needs (Washington DC: U.S General Accounting 
Office, 1974), 1, 5.  
31 Ibid., 7.  
32 Elmer Staats, Navigation Planning: Need for a New Direction (Washington DC: U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 1978), i.   
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid., i–ii.  
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plan to reduce the number and redundancy of federal radio navigation 
systems.35  
Since 1980, the U.S. Departments of Defense, and Transportation (DOT) 
have been jointly responsible for meeting Congress’s requirement for a 
government navigation plan; the Department of Homeland Security was also 
given this responsibility in 2002.36 This plan is known as the U.S. Federal Radio 
Navigation Plan and has generally speaking been published every two years. 
These plans have since 1980 have called for the for the minimum number of 
federal navigation systems required to meet air, land, and marine navigation 
requirements.37 They have used GPS to make this objective a reality. They have 
consistently called for GPS to replace federal radio navigation systems that are 
no longer cost-effective. Over the course of approximately 30 years, the U.S. has 
decommissioned all of its other satellite and terrestrial radio navigation systems. 
In their place, it has created a system of systems that use GPS to meet the 
positioning, navigation, and timing requirements of virtually all of the U.S. air, 
land, and marine federal radio navigation system users.  
The literature characterizing GPS as a management tool has several 
major shortcomings. For instance, it assumes multiple and overlapping federal 
radio navigation systems are redundant and not cost-effective. This assumption 
may no longer hold true now given that the world has changed dramatically since 
the first U.S. Radio Navigation Plan was published in 1980. Specifically, GPS’s 
use has expanded far beyond navigation to include many more uses such as 
telecommunications, logistics, and information technology. U.S. Federal Radio 
Navigation Plans recognize this changes and indicate there are opportunity 
costs, and trade-offs in making radio navigation policy decisions. They outline an 
                                            
35 International Maritime Satellite Telecommunications Act, Pub L. No. 95-564, Stat. 2394 
(1978), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg2392.pdf.  
36 The Department of the Homeland Security became a signatory to the U.S. Federal Radio 
Navigation Plan with the passage of Homeland Security Act of 2002. The 2005 Federal Radio 
Navigation Plan was the first one to include the DHS as a signatory.  
37 This is based on my reading of the U.S. Federal Radio Navigation Plans and my 
understanding of the literature.  
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analytical process to address them; however, there does not appear to be any 
public reports verifying how these trade-off analyses occurred. Finally, this body 
of literature does not take into account how GPS may have eroded the systems 
and processes needed to operate without it.  
2. GPS is an Element of American Foreign Policy, National 
Defense, and Economic Policy 
The U.S. in addition to using GPS as a management tool has made it an 
element of its foreign policy, national defense, and economic policies. America 
has consistently and publicly affirmed that the world would benefit through the 
shared use of GPS. President Reagan is credited with starting this trend, when, 
in response to the Soviet Union’s shooting down of a lost Korean Airliner in 1983, 
he formally declared the U.S. would make GPS available for civilian use.38  
Ten years later, the U.S. government began commissioning a series of 
policy studies to determine how it should govern the GPS a dual-use system—
one that can be used for military and civilian purposes. The 1993 Joint DOD/DOT 
Task Force on GPS conducted a policy analysis to determine how to best govern 
GPS as a dual-use system. Its recommendations were that DOD and DOT 
should jointly manage the GPS system.39 In 1995, the National Academy of 
Public Administration (NAPA) and National Research Council (NRC) suggested 
the governance of GPS should be expanded beyond DOD and DOT to include 
the Departments of State, Commerce, and the Interior.40 Also in 1995, RAND 
provided some support for these recommendations by recommending the U.S. 
                                            
38 “Statement by Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the Soviet Attack on a Korean Civilian 
Airliner,” American Presidency Project, September 16, 1983, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=41856.  
39 Joint DOD/DOT Task Force, The Global Positioning System Management and Operation 
of a Dual Use System: A Report to the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation (Washington 
DC: U.S. Departments of Defense and Transportation, 1993), ES2–ES3. 
40 National Academy of Public Administration [NAPA] and National Research Council [NRC], 
The Global Positioning System: Charting the Future Summary Report (Washington DC: National 
Academy of Public Administration, 1995), ix.  
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maintain control over the GPS system while allowing either public or private 
organizations to operate GPS augmentations.41   
During the studies, the U.S. government reexamined the issue of how 
GPS should be funded. Up to that time, America had been providing its GPS 
signals free of charge. The 1993 Joint/DOD Task Force recommended the U.S. 
government continue to provide the service of GPS and its augmentations 
without charging users.42 In 1995, NAPA/NRC concluded this funding 
arrangement was “remarkably sound” and should be kept in place.43 Additionally, 
it asserted there was no need for major change.44 Moreover, it noted that the 
U.S. has and would continue to receive economic and strategic benefit by 
providing GPS free of charge. Specifically, GPS would become the world’s de 
facto satellite radio navigation system and would stimulate U.S. and international 
economic growth and innovation.45 RAND agreed with this assessment, stating 
that the U.S.’ “no fee approach” had stimulated GPS adoption and economic 
growth. RAND also noted would be “difficult or impossible” to collect user fees.46 
The U.S. government’s GPS studies examined the issues of adversaries 
using GPS and its augmentations against America and its allies. The 1993 Joint 
DOD/DOT Task force argued that the U.S. should provide ground and satellite 
based GPS augmentations but expressed concern these systems undermine 
selective availability (SA)—a GPS design feature that allows the U.S. to 
intentionally degrade the GPS’s civil signal in order to prevent enemy use.47 In 
their 1995 report, NAPA and NRC,  all acknowledged these concerns but pointed 
out that an enemy sophisticated enough to use guided weapons could find ways 
                                            
41 Scott Pace et al., The Global Positioning System Assessing National Policies (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), xxvi–xxvii.     
42 Joint DOD/DOT Task Force, The Global Positioning System, ES–3.  
43 NAPA and NRC, The Global Positioning System, viii.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid., 6–12.  
46 Pace et al., The Global Positioning System, xxi.  
47 Joint DOD/DOT Task Force, The Global Positioning System, 33.  
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to circumvent SA.48Furthermore, reports from the DOD/DOT Task Force noted 
foreign governments were suspicious of SA, making them hesitant to fully adopt 
GPS.49 Therefore, all of these studies recommend the U.S. consider courses of 
actions, such as presidential directives, treaties and legislation, to alleviate these 
concerns.  
The U.S. government since GPS became fully operational has 
implemented the majority of the recommendations made in these studies. 
Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have published national policies affirming 
the U.S.’ commitment to promoting the free and peaceful use of GPS’s civil 
signals.50 These stated the U.S. would work with other nations to facilitate the 
use of GPS for scientific and transportation purposes. In addition, they directed 
the use of national level committees and boards to advise and coordinate the 
federal government’s GPS related efforts. In addition, the U.S. government has 
also established federally operated GPS augmentation—systems that further 
increase GPS’s accuracy and make it suitable for activities such as commercial 
aviation, which require precise navigation.51  
Congress has also supported these presidential directives by enacting 
supporting legislation and authorizing GPS acquisitions. U.S. Code Title 10, § 
2281 requires DOD to provide the civil GPS signal globally free of charge.52 It 
also directs DOD to develop the capabilities to prevent enemy use of GPS 
without disrupting service for its peaceful use. In addition, the Strom Thurmond 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 authorizes the DOD to 
                                            
48 NAPA and NRC, The Global Positioning System, 24; Pace et al., The Global Positioning 
System, 90.  
49 Joint DOD/DOT Task Force, The Global Positioning System, 45.  
50 White House, NSPD-39; Office of Science and Technology, National Security Council, 
“Fact Sheet Global Positioning System,” press release, March 29, 1996, http://clinton2.nara.gov/
WH/EOP/OSTP/html/gps-factsheet.html. 
51 DOD, DHS, and DOT, 2014 Federal Radio Navigation Plan, 5-9, 5-10.  
52 National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing, “United 
States Code,” last modified February 5, 2016, http://www.gps.gov/policy/legislation/
uscode/#title10.  
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modernize GPS by building satellites capable of broadcasting multiple civil and 
military signals.53 Furthermore, Title 51 of the U.S. Code, § 50112 urges the free 
global provision of GPS and the “promotion of GPS as an international 
standard.”54 Finally, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007 authorizes funding for the “National Space-Based Positioning, 
Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee and related organizations” for 
purpose of providing national oversight of America’s GPS efforts.55 
Generally speaking, the literature directly asserts or implies that these 
presidential directives and supporting legislation are the source of GPS’s 
success as technology but notes they may also be a source of vulnerability. One 
author, Lachow asserts GPS provides significant economic and military benefits, 
but it also provides enemies with an opportunity to attack the U.S.56 He asserts 
the U.S. risks losing GPS’s benefits if it restricts civilian access to GPS and its 
augmentations. Writing in 2002, McNeff contends that due to U.S. government 
policies, GPS has become a very successful technology, and he argues the 
biggest risk to GPS is its management.57 The U.S. has to manage and adapt the 
system for the future military and economic environment. Johnson and Warner 
state that GPS has become extremely important to the U.S. economy; however, 
they warn GPS’s civil signals are vulnerable to attack as their signals are 
“unencrypted and unauthenticated.”58 Hoey and Benshoof provide similar 
findings, noting GPS has become extremely important to the U.S. military and 
                                            
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Irving Lachow, “The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits,” 
International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 126–148.  
57 Jules McNeff, “The Global Positioning System,” IEEE Transaction on Microwave Theory 
and Techniques 50, no. 3 (2002): 645–652.  
58 Roger Johnson and Joo Warner, “Think GPS Offers High Security? Think Again” 
(presented at Business Contingency Planning Conference, Las Vegas, NV: Los Alamos Labs, 
2004), http://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-UR-04-1692.  
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economy.59 Their warning is also similar to that of Johnson and Warner, as they 
note the GPS’s civil signal is vulnerable to disruption and warn that the U.S. is 
becoming too reliant on GPS. 
3. GPS is Vulnerable  
The U.S. has designed and modified the GPS system to be extremely 
resistant to man-made and natural disruptions. It has employed a variety of 
means, such as extra satellites, new signals, constant monitoring, and 
international partnerships, to achieve this outcome. Current U.S. policy as 
collectively expressed in the president’s 2010 budget, the 2010 Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, and the “Record of Decision on the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s Long Range Navigation (LORAN-C) Program” assumes existing 
backups are sufficient to prevent and mitigate GPS disruptions.60 However, there 
is a small body of the policy literature consisting of works from the military, 
transportation, and scientific fields challenging this assertion.  
a. Military Literature  
American military policy literature, such as McPherson, Revoir, Cluff, and 
Wilgenbusch and Heisig, have voiced concerns that GPS has become a critical 
vulnerability.61 GPS has transformed how American and allied forces are 
                                            
59 David Hoey and Paul Benshoof, Civil GPS Systems and Potential Vulnerabilities (Eglin 
AFB, FL: 46th Test Group, 2005), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a440379.pdf.  
60 “Record of Decision (ROD) on the U.S. Coast Guard,” 997; “Terminate Long Range Aids,” 
998; Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83 (2009); 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Terminations, Reductions, and Savings Budget of the 




61 Michael McPherson, GPS and the Joint Force Commander: Critical Asset, Critical 
Vulnerability (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001); J. W. Rooker, Satellite Vulnerabilities EWS 
Contemporary Issue Paper (U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, 2008), 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a507952.pdf; James Cluff, Where’s My GPS?  Ensuring 
Combat Capability in Degraded PNT Environment (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 
2011); Ronald Wilgenbusch and Alan Heisig, “Command and Control Vulnerabilities to 
Communications Jamming,” Joint Forces Quarterly 69, no. 2 (2013): 56–63, 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-69/JFQ-69_56-63_Wilgenbusch-Heisig.pdf.  
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organized, trained, and equipped. Specifically, GPS has enabled the 
development and operations of an extremely efficient, lethal and mobile military 
force that routinely uses a wide array of advanced technologies, such as drones, 
guided munitions, precision strike weapons, and satellite imagery. Enemy denial 
or degradation of GPS could reduce or eliminate the military advantages these 
technologies provide.  
The reviewed U.S. military literature assumes GPS will be attacked during 
an armed conflict. There is broad agreement within this literature that these 
attacks will most likely include electronic jamming. Nation states and non-state 
actors can easily purchase or fabricate jammers. Cluff points out China, North 
Korea, Russia, and Taiwan are just some of the nations that manufacture and 
sell GPS jammers. He also reports that Iraq and North Korea have previously 
jammed GPS. Moreover, this literature acknowledges that nation states, such as 
China and Russia, have developed or are developing new aircraft, cruise 
missiles, and anti-satellite weapons that could be used to attack GPS satellites 
and ground infrastructure. However, there is disagreement as to whether or not 
the foreign nations will actually attack these targets. Successfully doing so is 
believed to be difficult, provide limited strategic benefit, and would dramatically 
escalate a conflict. 
b. Transportation Literature  
The U.S. DOT commissioned four major studies between 2001 and 2006 
that recommended the U.S. develop a national backup to GPS. For example, 
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center found that the U.S. 
transportation industry was extremely reliant on GPS and could experience 
difficulty in a severe GPS disruption.62 It recommended the U.S. emphasize that 
transportation industry train for GPS loss, encourage use of GPS signal integrity 
monitors, develop in-vehicle GPS backups, and evaluate the range of radio 
                                            
62 John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center [Volpe], Vulnerability Assessment 
of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System (Cambridge MA: 
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2001), ES3.  
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navigation systems necessary to backup GPS.63 Another report by Volpe 
concluded that the benefits of using U.S. Coast Guard Long Range Navigation 
System (LORAN), a terrestrial radio navigation system, exceeded its cost if GPS 
experienced extended regional outages.64 Narins concluded with some changes 
in equipment and signal modification that LORAN could serve as marine GPS 
backup and a limited aviation backup.65 Parkinson et al. also favor LORAN as a 
back up to GPS. After they reviewed these and other relevant technical studies, 
they recommended that the U.S. government recapitalize LORAN to serve as a 
backup to GPS.66 Based on these studies, DHS, with the concurrence of the 
Department of Homeland Security, announced via a press release that LORAN 
would serve as a national backup to GPS.67 However, in a very unusual decision, 
the president and Congress rejected this consensus decision directing the Coast 
Guard to terminate the LORAN program.68 They made this decision based on the 
determination that existing GPS backups were sufficient and that shutting down 
LORAN would save the taxpayer’s money.69  
The transportation literature examining the need for a GPS’s backup has 
strengths and limitations, and it is primarily focused on the engineering and 
transportation concerns. For instance, Volpe provides an overview of GPS uses, 
vulnerabilities, and backups. It evaluates how GPS is used by function and 
                                            
63 Ibid., ES6.  
64 John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center [Volpe], Benefit-Cost Assessment 
of the Use of LORAN to Mitigate GPS Vulnerability for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 
Services (Cambridge MA: John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2004).  
65 Mitchell Narins, Loran’s Capability to Mitigate the Impact of a GPS Outage on GPS 
Position, Navigation, and Time Applications (Washington DC: Federal Aviation Administration, 
2004).  
66 Parkinson et al., Independent Assessment Team.  
67 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement from DHS Press Secretary Laura 
Keehhner on the Adoption of National Backup System to GPS,” February 7, 2008, 
http://rntfnd.org/wp-content/uploads/DHS-Press-Release-GPS-Backup-2008.pdf.  
68 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010; “Record of Decision (ROD) 
on the U.S. Coast Guard,” 997; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Terminations, 
Reductions, and Savings.  
69 Ibid.  
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potential backups at different levels of transportation activity. It acknowledges but 
does not focus on the broader policy implications of the identified GPS 
vulnerabilities. Volpe considers GPS a supplement to existing navigation and 
timing technologies but underestimates its benefits. Furthermore, its report does 
not account for the opportunity costs (loss of life, inability to efficiently conduct 
operations) in the event of a GPS disruption.70 The document by Narins, 
published by the Federal Aviation Administration, is primarily an engineering 
document and does not focus on surface transportation applications that may 
need a GPS backup.71 It does not take this field of users into account as there 
are no specified requirements to the performance of GPS’s land applications.72 
Though Parkinson et al. provide a summary of how LORAN can serve as backup 
to GPS and discuss some of the challenges, technical adoptions, and costs 
associated with making LORAN a GPS backup, they do not provide an in-depth 
discussion of the larger policy implications of not backing up GPS.73 Finally, this 
body of literature assumes intentional interference will be the most likely cause of 
a GPS disruption.  
c. Scientific Literature  
In the 2000s, the U.S. government, scientific community, and private 
industry became increasingly concerned about the impacts of extreme space 
weather, conditions in space that affect the Earth and its technological systems, 
on GPS. The extreme space literature, such as works from National Science and 
Technology Council (NSATC), Ferguson et al., and Kiessling, have noted that 
society has become increasingly critically dependent on various critical 
infrastructures and systems, such as aircraft electrical grids, pipelines, and 
                                            
70 Volpe, Benefit-Cost Assessment.  
71 Narins, Loran’s Capability.  
72 Ibid., 3-7.  
73 Parkinson et al., Independent Assessment Team.  
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satellites.74 The literature points out atmospheric conditions on the sun can result 
in an abnormal amount of charged particles, electromagnetic energy, and plasma 
being radiated toward Earth. Depending on their severity, these solar emissions 
can cause a blackout of terrestrial and satellite radio broadcasts, disrupt 
electrical grids and pipelines, damage satellites and electronic equipment, and 
result in unsafe conditions for people (astronauts, pilots, and aircraft passengers) 
in the Earth’s upper atmosphere.  
The extreme space weather literature challenges the assertion that man-
made interference is the most likely source of a major disruption. The National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Space Weather from the Sun explains 
that the potential for extreme space weather always exists as the sun is 
continuously emitting charged particles and electromagnetic energy towards the 
Earth. It notes that the potential frequency and severity of space weather varies 
with where the sun is in its solar cycle—an 11-year period in which the number of 
sunspots goes from a minimum to a maximum and then returns to a minimum. It 
specifically asserts that the likelihood of extreme space increases as the solar 
maximum is approached.75  
In addition, in 2013, the United Kingdom’s Royal Academy of Engineering 
(RAE) estimated that every year there is up to a 12 percent chance of a 
Carrington event occurring.76 This event is a type of extreme space weather 
consisting of a major coronal mass ejection that hurls an enormous amount of 
charged particles, electromagnetic energy, and plasma toward the Earth. The 
                                            
74 National Science and Technology Council, National Space Weather Strategy (Washington 
DC: Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2015); Dale Ferguson, Simon 
Worden, and Daniel Hastings, “The Space Weather Threat to Situational Awareness, 
Communications, and Positioning Systems,” IEEE Transaction On Plasma Science 43, no. 9 
(2015): 3086–3098; James Kiessling, “Robust Navigation Issue in the Event of GNSS Failures,” 
2013, http://www.cacr.caltech.edu/futureofutc/preprints/files/15_AAS%2013-508_Kiessling.pdf.  
75 Ferguson, Worden, and Hastings, “The Space Weather Threat.”   
76 Royal Academy of Engineering, Extreme Space Weather: Impacts on Engineered 
Systems and Infrastructure (London, UK: Royal Academy of Engineering, 2013), 
http://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/space-weather-full-report, 21.  
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RAE anticipates a Carrington event could disrupt GPS for up to three days and 
potentially damage or destroy some GPS satellites.77  
The reviewed literature on extreme space weather has several limitations, 
which sources acknowledge in a very forthright manner. Overall, the sources 
making up the literature provide an overview and warnings of what are believed 
to be the most salient impacts of the different forms of extreme space weather; 
however, they do not include in-depth analyses or detailed estimates of the 
impacts of the space weather events. The NSATC recognizes space weather can 
pose an extreme threat event. Not only does it recommend the U.S. improve its 
understanding of space weather effects on critical infrastructure, it also 
recommends the U.S. enhance its capabilities to protect, mitigate, respond, and 
recover from extreme space weather.78  
B. SUMMARY OF THE THREE GPS LITERATURE THEMES  
This review showed there are three themes within the GPS literature that 
can help frame research on GPS’s vulnerabilities. America’s use of GPS as a 
management tool has reduced the number of federal radio navigation systems, 
which has limited the U.S.’ ability to operate during an interruption in GPS 
service. Moreover, the U.S.’ treatment of GPS as an open technology has 
contributed to its widespread adoption. Finally, the U.S.’ military, transportation 
and scientific communities have warned that because of these two factors GPS 
is far more vulnerable than believed. 
The major shortcoming of these three themes is that they do not fully 
explain GPS’s value proposition. Nor do they take into account how and why 
GPS provides benefits to those who directly and indirectly rely on it. The U.S. 
cannot effectively address GPS’s vulnerabilities without taking these benefits into 
account. 
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III. THE GPS SYSTEM
This chapter provides an overview of the two different sets of systems that 
make up GPS’s operational infrastructure. First, it describes the GPS system, 
which consists of the satellites and ground infrastructure that produces and 
transmits GPS signals to users.79 Then, it introduces and explains the specific 
roles America’s five GPS augmentation systems, which improve the accuracy 
and reliability of GPS signals, allowing them to be use for activities with precise 
navigation requirements.80 An understanding of how GPS and its augmentations 
work together is necessary to understand the nature of GPS’s criticality, 
resilience, and vulnerability.  
A. THE GPS SYSTEM 
The GPS system provides the basic signals that serve as the foundation 
for how GPS is used. It consists of three elements: space, control, and user. The 
U.S. government operates the space segment, which consists of GPS’s 
satellites, and the control segment, which consists of GPS’s ground 
infrastructure.81 The GPS user segments consist of everyone who uses a GPS 
receiver.82 Each of these segments plays a different role in GPS’s operation. 
1. Space Segment
The space segment has 31 operational satellites and several 
decommissioned satellites, which can be reactivated if needed.83 These 
satellites fly above the Earth at altitude of 12,550 miles and are distributed 
79 10 U.S.C. § 2281. 
80 White House, NSPD-39. 
81 U.S. Department of Defense [DOD], Global Positioning System Standard Positioning 
Service Performance Standard, 4th ed. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), 
http://www.gps.gov/technical/ps/2008-SPS-performance-standard.pdf, 1, 3.  
82 National Coordination Office, “The Global Positioning System.” 
83 National Coordination Office, “Space Segment.”  
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between six orbital planes.84 Every GPS satellite in a 24-hour period will 
complete two orbits. This satellite constellation configuration provides the world 
with global GPS signal coverages. Most GPS users will receive signals from six 
satellites (only four are required to produce reliable navigation information.).85 
There are currently three satellite generations in the operational GPS 
constellation. Each new generation of GPS satellites has new capabilities, 
making their signals more accurate, reliable, and resistant to interruption. Table 1 
summarizes the salient characteristics of each of the three generations of 
operational GPS satellites. 
Table 1.   GPS’s Operational Satellite Constellation86 
Characteristics IIR IIR(M) IIF 
Number 12 7 12 
Design life 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Launch years 1997–2004 2005–2009 2010–2016 
Civil signals 1 2 3 
Military signals 2 2 2 
Military code No Yes Yes 
Block IIR satellites are the oldest and least capable generation of GPS 
satellites. They account for 12 out of 31 operational GPS satellites 
(approximately 39 percent).87 They entered service between 1997 and 2004 are 
beyond their 7.5-year design life,88 and they broadcast only two signals. One of 
these signals is partially decrypted for civil GPS users,89 and their second signal 
84 Ibid. 
85 U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, “General Information on GPS,” February 1, 2016, 
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=GPSmain.  





is fully encrypted for military use.90 They have the selective availability (SA) 
capability, which is a feature that allows the U.S. Air Force to degrade the civil 
GPS signal. SA reduces the ability of adversaries to use GPS to attack America 
and its allies. 
The smallest generation of GPS satellites is the Block IIR (M) group. 
These satellites account for 23 percent of operational GPS satellites (seven out 
of 31).91 They started operating between 2005 and 2009,92 and they have all 
their surpassed their service life of 7.5 years.93 Block IIR (M) satellites broadcast 
three sets of signals. They transmit two unencrypted civil signals and two 
encrypted military signals.94 Additionally, they broadcast military code, which are 
encrypted signals to transmitted within a frequency range; military code signals 
do not have a fixed frequency.95 Furthermore, they can also boost the power of 
some military signals, making them more resistant to jamming.96 Finally, they 
have the selective availability capability.  
Block IIF satellites are the newest GPS satellite generation. The 12 Block 
IIF satellites make up approximately 39 percent of GPS’s 31 satellite 
constellation.97 They all started operations between 2010 and 2016.98 They have 
a 12-year design life, which is 64 percent greater than the design life of 7.5 years 
of previous generations.99 They broadcast all of same signals as the Block II R 












(M) satellites.100 In addition, they broadcast a third civil signal.101 Finally, the U.S 
removed the selective availability capability from these satellites. 
2. Control Segment  
The control segment monitors and manages the performance of the GPS 
satellite constellation.102 It consists of three main elements: 2 master control 
stations, 15 monitoring stations, and 11 ground antennas.103 Figure 1 shows 
where these ground facilities are located.104 
 
Figure 1.  GPS Ground Control Segment105  
The master control station manages the operation of the GPS satellite 
constellation. It receives satellite tracking and atmospheric data from the 15 
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102 DOD, Global Positioning System, 5–6.  
103 National Coordination Office, “Control Segment.”  
104 Ibid. 
105 Source: National Coordination Office, “Control Segment.”  
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globally distributed monitoring stations.106 The master control station(s) uses the 
11 globally distributed ground antennas to synchronize GPS’s satellite clocks, 
upload navigation information, and if necessary issue orders to adjust satellite 
operations.107  
3. User Segment 
The GPS user segment consists of all organizations and individuals that 
use GPS receivers.108 For national security reasons, the U.S. has divided the 
GPS user segment into two different groups: military and civil.109 This approach 
provides two major benefits; it protects GPS military signals from interference 
while at the same time making GPS’s civil signals available for everyday use. 
Military users operate using encrypted GPS signals. They employ 
sophisticated GPS receivers and antennas that are not publicly available.110 
Furthermore, military GPS receivers operate using utilize multiple signals 
allowing them to make additional corrections to their estimates of location, 
course, speed, and altitude.111 Collectively, these factors make military GPS 
signals more resistant to enemy jamming, false broadcasts, and natural signal 
interference then civil GPS signals.   
Civil GPS users consist of organizations and individuals who use GPS’s 
unencrypted civil signals.112 They use less sophisticated receivers and antennas 
than military users. Many users of civil GPS receivers utilize one set of GPS 
signals, which means they cannot develop and apply correction to improve signal 
                                            
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 National Coordination Office, “The Global Positioning System.”  
109 Congressional Budget Office [CBO], The Global Positioning System for Military Users: 
Current Modernization Plans and Alternatives (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office, 
2011), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42727, 1–3.  
110 Ibid., 37–43. 
111 National Coordination Office, “GPS Accuracy,” last modified August 31, 2016, 
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accuracy.113 Furthermore, foreign militaries and manufacturers have developed 
jammers that can interfere with GPS signals over small and large areas.114 As a 
result, civil GPS users have a higher level of vulnerability to intentional and 
unintentional interruptions in service than military GPS users.  
B. GPS AUGMENTATIONS 
GPS’s basic civil signal is not sufficient for applications require precise 
navigation information such as commercial aviation and marine shipping.115 
Therefore, the U.S. operates and participates in several domestic and 
international augmentation efforts that improve the accuracy and reliability of the 
standard GPS signal.  
Table 2 shows the U.S.’ five federally funded and/or supported GPS 
augmentation systems. Each of these augmentations serves a specific 
navigation region and purpose. Moreover, all of these systems rely on GPS’s 
unencrypted standard positioning signal. This means these augmentation 
systems will not operate if GPS service is interrupted.   
                                            
113 National Coordination Office, “GPS Accuracy.”  
114 PNT, Jamming the Global Positioning System, 4–6; CBO, The Global Positioning 
System, 41–42.  
115 White House, NSPD-39; DOD, DHS, and DOT, 2014 Federal Radio Navigation Plan, 5-9.   
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Table 2.   U.S. GPS Augmentation Systems 
Augmentation  Regions Served Primary Use 
Nationwide Differential GPS U.S. 
Marine and surface 
transportation 
Wide Area Augmentation 




Central America Surveying and monitoring 
Global differential GPS  International 
Space applications and 
commercial aviation 
International Global Satellite 
Systems Service  International  
Earth science and 
geodesy 
 
Three of the augmentation systems provide service to North American 
GPS users. The Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System consists of 46 
sites within the U.S that provide GPS signal corrections to surface and marine 
users.116 The Wide-Area Augmentation System consisting of two operational 
control centers, three master stations, three geostationary satellites, six ground 
stations, and 38 reference stations, and three geostationary satellites that 
provide signal corrections to North American commercial aviation.117 The 
Continuously Operation Reference Stations (CORS) network is a consortium of 
over 200 institutions operating approximately 2000 stations throughout the U.S., 
the Caribbean, and Central America.118 Using the data from the CORS network, 
                                            
116 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, “Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS) Program,” accessed 
August 21, 2016, http://www.rita.dot.gov/pnt/major_initiatives/
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117 Jason Burns, Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)—Program Status Update 
(Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration, 2013), http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
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August 24, 2015, http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/CORS/; National Geodetic Survey, “CORS MAP,” last 
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the U.S. develops and distributes GPS signal improvements for positioning, 
navigation, meteorology, and geophysics.119 
The U.S. also participates and supports two international GPS 
augmentations systems: Global Differential GPS (GDGPS) and the International 
Global Navigation Satellite Service (IGS). GDGPS provides corrections to U.S. 
Chinese, European Union, and Russia satellite navigation signals.120 In addition, 
it facilitates U.S. aviation and space operations, improves the navigation 
capabilities of mobile devices, and allows public safety agencies to determine the 
location of emergency cellular phone calls.121 The IGS is an international effort 
consisting of over 200 organizations focused on using data from the world’s 
satellite navigation systems to improve satellite orbits and to scientifically 
measure the Earth’s shape, rotation, and atmospheric conditions.122 
GPS and it augmentations are important navigation and timing systems. 
They provide vital signals to the national and homeland security of America and 
many other nations. Moreover, GPS signal interruptions can stop or degrade the 
operations of critical military and civilian systems. Therefore, the U.S must 
prevent and mitigate the consequences of GPS outages. Examination of GPS 
and its augmentations from the perspective of a public utility (Chapter IV) as well 
as that of a software platform (Chapter V) can provide additional insights about 
criticality, resilience, and vulnerability. This new knowledge may help the U.S. 
more effectively prevent and mitigate GPS disruptions.  
                                            
119 Richard Snay, “The National & Cooperative CORS Program” (presented at CORS Users 
Forum, Silver Spring, MD, April 19, 2002), http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/CORS/Presentations/
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120 Jet Propulsion Laboratory California Institute of Technology [JPL], “System Description—
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IV. THE PUBLIC UTILITY CONCEPTUAL LENS 
This chapter develops and applies a public utility conceptual lens to 
examine in what ways GPS operates as a physical infrastructure that produces 
and delivers essential goods or services to its users.123 Moreover, it examines 
economic and infrastructure conceptualizations and definitions of public utilities 
to develop a lens to explain how a physical infrastructure salient characteristics 
influence its operations, vulnerabilities, and protection strategies. Then, it 
examines to what extent GPS conforms to the public utility lens. Finally, it 
discusses how the public utility lens informs our understanding of GPS’s 
criticality, resilience, and vulnerabilities.  
A. THE PUBLIC UTILITY CONCEPTUAL LENS 
The public utility lens provides a framework to examine how a physical 
infrastructure’s major characteristics influence its operations, vulnerabilities, and 
protection strategies. There is no one definition that can be used to fully describe 
a public utility’s major traits, processes, weaknesses and protection strategies.124 
Public utilities include a broad range of regulated and unregulated industries, 
which, in terms of their major characteristics, can be indistinguishable from 
unregulated firms.125 This means that the criteria used to commonly define a 
public utility may not always be valid. Examination of several public utility 
definitions from the economics and critical infrastructure fields overcomes this 
limitation by providing a broader perspective in identifying the most salient public 
utility characteristics.  
                                            
123 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations 
Protecting Americas Infrastructure. The Report of the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (Washington DC: President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
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1. Economics 
Economists have defined public utilities in four different ways: general 
purpose technologies, natural monopolies, regulated enterprises, and physical 
networks. Each of these definitions provides different insights on the major traits 
of public utilities. Public utilities, such as electricity and railroads, can be 
considered general purpose technologies.126 They are widely used, have 
demonstrated significant improvement, and spurred the development of new 
products and services.127 Firms and other infrastructures in an area can improve 
their productivity by purchasing equipment and services allowing them to 
incorporate a public utility’s output into their operations.128 In turn, businesses 
conduct additional research and make development investments, which over 
time, improve the public utility, existing products and services, and lead to 
creation of new products and services.129 This definition implies that if a public 
utility’s service is interrupted, every firm in the affected region could suffer 
economic losses.  
Public utilities, like electric companies and water authorities, have been 
historically defined and treated as a regulated monopoly provider of good or 
service.130 Geddes indicates the reason for this is that public utilities historically 
have been considered natural monopolies.131 A major characteristic of a natural 
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monopoly is that they are believed to produce economies of scale—an outcome 
in which a firm’s average production cost declines over its entire range of 
output.132 Public utilities have been considered natural monopolies because they 
incur high fixed costs due to operating and maintaining the physical infrastructure 
necessary to provide their customers with service.133 These average fixed costs 
decline as they are spread over more customers.134 Therefore, governments 
regulate public utilities to maintain their economies of scale and to limit the 
unnecessary infrastructure duplication that would result from competition.135 
However, this comes with two potential risks. One, it can make a region more 
dependent on a utility as there is an incentive to maximize its use. Two, it can 
limit a region’s resiliency as it does not allow competitors to build additional 
infrastructure.  
Bonbright asserts a public utility is simply an enterprise requiring 
government regulation to establish and maintain the physical connection 
between its infrastructure and customer.136 A public utility, such as an electric 
company, cannot provide its customers with their products and services without 
this connection. Furthermore, he argues that a firm should not be considered a 
utility simply because it has economies of scale and produces an essential 
product.137 These criteria are of limited usefulness because regulated and 
unregulated firms often demonstrate these characteristics.138 In other words, 
public utilities and private business can produce vital goods and services as well 
as achieve economies of scale. 
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Analysis of Bonbright’s arguments suggests three conditions must be met 
for a firm to be considered a public utility. One, a firm must require a permanent 
physical connection with its customers in order to provide them with continuous 
service or supply of vital products.139 Two, government regulations are required 
to establish and maintain these physical connections between a firm and its 
customers.140 Three, the government in the interest of protecting the public and/
or promoting the abundance of a vital good or service directly controls the prices 
a firm can charge its customers.141 Bonbright’s arguments suggest government 
regulation of a utility may be necessary, but it may also make a nation or region 
overly dependent on a public utility’s output.  
Geddes points out there are many different types of public utilities, such 
cable television, railroads, and telecommunications, and that they tend to have 
large infrastructures.142 Governments or private firms can own some or all of this 
infrastructure.143 Moreover, these infrastructures are actually networks, which 
can be broken into three elements: production, transmission, and distribution.144 
The production element creates a good or service.145 The transmission and 
distribution elements transport the goods or services to the utility’s customers.146 
These physical networks may not operate if one of more of their elements is 
rendered inoperable. Implicit in Geddes’s discussion is that a utility may not be 
able to operate if one or more of the elements stops working and/or the network 
is severed.  
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According to Geddes, a utility’s three elements can be owned and 
operated by one firm or many firms.147 This implicitly raises the possibility that 
when a government is determining if and how a utility is regulated that it makes a 
tradeoff between its costs and resiliency. One firm may be able to operate a 
utility in a very cost-effective manner. This may be the result of regulatory and/or 
market conditions that in effect create entry barriers preventing other firms from 
entering the utility’s market. This in turn can constrain a utility’s resiliency as it 
limits the amount of additional infrastructure that may be built as a result of 
competition.  
2. Critical Infrastructure  
The critical infrastructure literature broadens the concept of a utility to 
include external factors, such as people and regulations, that influence the nature 
of its operations. An examination of two different infrastructure definitions 
provides support for how the economics literature has conceptualized public 
utilities.  
Jonsson has developed a concept of infrastructure systems that provides 
an expanded view of a utility. He notes that infrastructure systems are like public 
utilities in that they provide society with products and services, such as electricity 
and water, that improve the quality of life.148 They distribute and deliver 
“specialized services, materials, and assets to households, companies and other 
organizations.”149 Moreover, they are designed to quickly, cheaply, and reliably 
produce one type of product or service.150 They serve as the foundation of 
secondary services, such as firefighting and laundry service with water systems, 
which rely on infrastructure system.151 Furthermore, they are used in 
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combination with other infrastructure systems.152 However, these systems are 
different then public utilities as they include “the organizations and people, who 
use, build and operate the system and the economic and legal conditions for the 
activities.”153  
The infrastructure definition of U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) also provides an expanded view of utilities: 
The framework of interdependent networks and systems 
comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including people and 
procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow 
of products and services essential to the defense and economic 
security of the United States the smooth functioning of Government 
at all levels, and society as a whole.154 
DHS recognizes that infrastructures are equivalent to public utilities in that they 
can consist of networks delivering vital goods and services to their customers. 
Moreover, it acknowledges that multiple utilities work together to provide all of the 
essential products and services that a nation requires to function. Finally, it also 
recognizes infrastructures as physical networks.  
The infrastructure definitions of Jonsson and DHS provide support for both 
the economics and infrastructure public utility definitions. They both support the 
notion that public utilities are general purpose technologies that serve as a 
regional and national economic foundation. Additionally, they acknowledge that 
factors external to public utility operations, such as people and organization, can 
have an impact on a public utility’s performance. Jonsson in particular notes the 
efficiency of public utilities in providing their services is a mixed blessing. 
Societies can become overly dependent on them, which can constrain their 
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ability to address infrastructure related issues.155 Finally, these definitions 
recognize public utilities are physical networks.  
3. Summary: The Public Utility Len’s Salient Characteristics and 
Protection Strategy  
Four major salient characteristics emerge from examination of economics 
and critical infrastructure literature definitions of public utilities. First, public 
utilities are extremely important because they serve as the economic foundation 
of a nation and its regions. Second, the government regulation is required to 
establish and protect the physical connection necessary for a public utility to 
provide service to its customers. Three, government regulation of utility promotes 
a public utility’s efficiency but may do so at the potential cost of its resiliency. 
Fourth, a public utility is a networked physical infrastructure that “provides service 
over large geographical areas.”156  
4. Public Utility Protection Strategy  
A public utility must maintain a connection with its customers to provide 
them with continuous service. Public utilities are generally physical 
infrastructures, which means the impact of a service outage will generally be 
limited to the region served by the portion of network experiencing difficulty.157 A 
public utility can use a mix of three approaches to prevent or lessen these 
impacts. One, it can maintain backups and/or redundant systems for facilities and 
equipment that would require significant time to fix should they fail.158 Two, it 
could maximize the use of equipment that can be quickly repaired.159 Third, it 
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can encourage or require its customers to develop backups sufficient to meet 
their requirements during a service interruption.160 This mix of approaches can 
minimize the likelihood and severity of an interruption in a public utilities 
operation.  
B. GPS AS A PUBLIC UTILITY  
The public utility lens helps explain why the U.S. considers GPS to be a 
global utility critical to its “national security, economic growth, transportation 
safety, and an essential element of the worldwide economic infrastructure.”161 
GPS conforms to all of major characteristics of the public utility’s lens. Through 
its laws and policies, the U.S. has promoted GPS, transforming it from a 
navigation system to an economically important global utility. Moreover, it has 
treated GPS like a public utility in that it has made extensive use of redundancies 
to limit the geographic impact of service disruptions. 
1. U.S. Laws and Policies Have Transformed GPS into a Global 
Utility 
Through the development of its laws and policies, the U.S. has treated 
GPS like a global utility in that it has promoted GPS’s use. For instance, U.S. 
Code Title 10, § 2281, Global Positioning, requires America provide GPS civil 
signals for “peaceful, civil, commercial, and scientific uses on a continuous 
worldwide basis free of direct user fees.”162 U.S. Code, Title 51 encourages the 
president to “enter into international agreements…to establish the Global 
Positioning System and its augmentations as an acceptable international 
standard.”163 Moreover, to maximize the world’s use of GPS, the U.S. has made 
all of its technical specifications required to manufacture and use civil GPS 
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technologies freely available.164 Furthermore, America has designed the GPS 
satellite constellation to provide continuous global signal coverage.165 GPS civil 
signals are unencrypted, allowing anyone with a receiver to utilize them. Finally, 
the U.S. regulates and manages how its radio spectrum is used to prevent 
interference with the GPS signal, which serves as the link between GPS and its 
users.166  
As a result of these efforts, GPS, like public utilities, has become a widely 
used technology; however, the U.S. does not keep official statistics on the 
number of GPS devices in operation or how they are used. European Union 
(E.U.) estimates and forecasts show GPS is and will most likely continue to be a 
widely used technology. The E.U. estimated in 2014 there were 3.6 billion 
satellite navigation devices.167 Furthermore, the E.U has forecasted this number 
will grow to over 7 billion in 2019 – an increase of at least 94 percent.168 It is not 
known how many of these devices GPS compatible are. It can be safely 
assumed the majority of them are GPS devices. Manufacturers have been 
producing consumer electronics with GPS capabilities since the 1980s.169 
Furthermore, E.U. market research indicates that 80 percent of all satellite 
navigation devices available for purchases are compatible with GPS.170  
Preliminary studies of GPS economic importance highlight its value to the 
U.S. and the world. According to the U.S. Air Force, GPS has an annual 
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operating budget of approximately one billion dollars.171 In 2011, Pham 
calculated that in the United States alone GPS creates at least 67.6 billion dollars 
in direct economic benefits and that this value will increase to $122.4 billion when 
GPS reaches 100 percent use in “commercial GPS-intensive industries.”172 In 
2013, Oxera Consulting released a report estimating that the geo services 
industry, which relies on satellite navigation systems and devices, globally 
generates between 150 and 270 billion dollars in revenue per year.173  In 
addition, Leveson estimates in 2013 GPS’s use in the U.S. produced between 
37.1 and 74.5 billion dollars in economic benefits.174 
GPS is also vital to the operation of America’s three augmentations 
systems and two international consortiums, discussed in Chapter II. These 
systems are vital to America’s transportation system, surveying, earth monitoring, 
and space operations. They remove errors from GPS signals, making them more 
suitable for activities with precise navigation requirements.175 Each serves a vital 
purpose and set of users, and each of these systems requires GPS signals to 
operate, which means they may not be able to operate effectively during a GPS 
service interruption. During a GPS interruption, the Wide Area Augmentation 
System and Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System may not be able 
provide aviation, marine, and surface transportation users with the signal 
correction that improve their efficiency and safety.176 If there were an 
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interruption, the Continuously Operation Reference Stations (CORS) Network 
and International Global Navigation Satellite Service may not be able to provide 
the signals required for surveying, earthquake monitoring, and other activities 
requiring extreme precise navigation accuracy.177 Similiarly, the Global 
Differential GPS system may not be able to provide signal correction necessary 
for space operations, mobile device navigation, and location of emergency 
cellular phone calls in the event of a GPS interruption.178  
2. GPS Infrastructure is designed to Prevent and Minimize 
Disruption 
Like a public utility, GPS is designed and operated in a manner that seeks 
to prevent and limit the frequency and severity of service interruptions; however, 
it is different from a public utility in two fundamental ways. One, it operates using 
radio signals, which means it is not physically connected with its users. Two, it is 
designed and operated in such a manner that every individual element of its 
control (ground infrastructure) and space segments contributes to the global 
production GPS signals. This creates extensive redundancies within the GPS 
system. Together, these characteristics suggest GPS infrastructure failures are 
unlikely and will most likely have little to no impact on GPS’s operations.  
All GPS’s ground infrastructures are different from public utility production 
facilities in that they help create and transmit satellite signals for all of its users. 
Its 11 command and control antennas collect satellite telemetry data,179 While its 
15 monitoring stations track GPS satellites and gather data on atmospheric 
conditions.180 A master control station uses this data to develop signal 
corrections, which improve the accuracy of GPS signals. Furthermore, a master 
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control station uses the command and control antennas to upload these signal 
corrections and other navigation data to each GPS satellite.181 Finally, the 
master control station also provides each satellite with sufficient data to operate 
without ground control for up to 60 days.182  
GPS’s control segment has significant redundancies, which like those of a 
public utility, limits the likelihood and consequences of a service interruption. 
GPS requires a minimum of two master control stations, four command and 
control antennas, and six monitoring stations to meet its performance 
requirement of worldwide satellite availability 95 percent of the time.183 It 
currently has two master control stations, 11 command and control antennas, 
and 15 monitoring stations. It also has seven (75 percent) more antennas and 
nine (150 percent) more monitoring sites than necessary.184 This infrastructure is 
globally distributed across the world. Due to the redundancies, GPS can endure 
a significant amount of failure within its ground infrastructure and still be able to 
monitor and control GPS’s operations. Finally, GPS satellites can still continue to 
operate for an extended period of time after the entire ground infrastructure is 
lost.  
The space segment continues the production and distribution while at the 
same time minimizing the likelihood of signal interruptions. Each of GPS’s 
operational satellites are continuously generating and broadcasting its navigation 
signals. GPS users require signals from four different satellites for navigation and 
one satellite signal for timing.185 To meet these requirements and provide global 
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signal coverage, every satellite is constantly moving around the Earth to 
guarantee global signal coverage.186 As a result, the combinations of GPS 
satellites available for navigation are constantly changing as each satellite 
progresses through their individual orbits.187 This means that should a satellite 
failure occur, the time a poor satellite combination occurs will be minimized.  
The GPS satellite constellation has significant redundancies to increase its 
reliability as a public utility. A minimum of 24 GPS satellites is required to provide 
users with signals from four different satellites—the minimum required for 
navigation. The current 31 satellite constellations provide users with signals from 
six satellites.188 This means two satellite failures can occur, and most users will 
still be able to continue using GPS for navigation. Furthermore, the likelihood of a 
GPS satellite failure is small. Each satellite has redundant backup for every 
critical system. For example, each GPS satellite has three atomic clocks when 
only one is needed for its operation.189 Finally, the U.S. can reactivate 
decommissioned satellites or rearrange the GPS satellite constellation if several 
satellite failures occur.  
C. THE PUBLIC UTILITY LENS AND GPS’S CRITICALITY, RESILIENCE, 
AND VULNERABILITY 
The U.S. considers GPS to be a global information utility and one of its 
most important critical infrastructures.190 The public utility lens shows GPS is a 
general purpose technology and an infrastructure that does not require a fixed 
physical connection with its users to operate. This is because signals serve as 
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the link between the GPS satellite constellations and its receiver’s connection. 
Moreover, it begins to help explain how the U.S. has influenced the nature of 
GPS’s criticality, resilience, and vulnerabilities through its laws, polices, and 
GPS’s design.  
The public utility lens shows that through its laws and policies, America 
has transformed GPS from satellite navigation systems to a critical global 
infrastructure. It suggests the U.S. did this by addressing three of the biggest 
constraints to the adoption and diffusion of general purpose technologies that are 
utilities: infrastructure, technical knowledge, and cost. Historically, a lack of 
infrastructure and skilled workers limited the spread of general purpose 
technologies. Firms and households could not use a utility if the infrastructure 
required to use it was not present.191 Furthermore, there was not a sufficient 
number of workers with the knowledge required to build and use the utility.192 
Finally, the cost of adopting a public’s utility’s service was often financially 
unfavorable as the existing technology was still profitable.193  
In effect, America has accelerated GPS’s growth as a general purpose 
technology by addressing all of the constraints to adoption and diffusion. It has 
provided the world with the entire infrastructure required for global satellite 
navigation when it built GPS. Firms and individuals can begin using GPS by 
simply purchasing a GPS receiver. They did not have to wait for physical 
infrastructure to be built in their region. Moreover, The U.S. has supplied the 
knowledge necessary to use GPS by making all technical specifications freely 
available. Any firm or entrepreneur with the desire to do so can develop GPS 
related products and services. Finally, America addressed the cost concerns by 
making GPS civil signals available free of charge; anyone who has a receiver 
can use GPS.  
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The public utility lens reveals the U.S. has used system design and 
redundancies to improve GPS’s resilience. America has broadly distributed 
GPS’s satellite signal production, transmission, and distribution functions among 
all of its major elements in its ground and space infrastructures. This has two 
major benefits. It means that every individual system component is contributing 
to the global production of satellite signals. Furthermore, as a result of this design 
approach, the U.S. has improved GPS’s resilience by reducing the criticality of 
every individual element involved in the production and delivery of satellite 
signals to its users. Finally, the U.S. has further reduced this criticality by adding 
more satellite and ground infrastructure than is required for GPS to meet its 
minimum operating requirements. Collectively, these design decisions have 
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V. THE SOFTWARE PLATFORM CONCEPTUAL LENS 
This chapter develops and uses a software platform conceptual lens to 
examine the ways GPS operates as a computer operating system, allowing 
programs to run on hardware.194 First, it provides a general definition of a 
software platform and describes how the interaction between its three 
architectural elements determines the scope and scale of its use. Next, it 
evaluates the structure of the GPS system to determine in what ways its major 
components correspond to and function like those found in a software platform’s 
architecture. Lastly, it explains how the software platform lens informs our 
understanding of GPS’s criticality, resilience, and vulnerability.  
A. THE SOFTWARE PLATFORM CONCEPTUAL LENS 
The software platform conceptual lens focuses on the relationships 
between a computer operating system, applications, hardware, and the end 
users.195 A software platform uses an operating system’s digital code to provide 
programmers with the capability to develop applications that run on hardware.196 
Software platforms provide their end users with computing devices that can 
perform a wide range of general and specialized tasks.197 A platform’s 
technological architecture consists of three main elements: an operating system, 
complements, and interfaces.198 The interaction between these elements 
determines the scope and scale of a software platform’s use.199  
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A software platform’s operating system provides application developers 
and end users with a general set of computing capabilities.200 These consist of a 
core set of programs and hardware, which relative to the rest of the software 
platform elements, changes slowly over time.201 Application developers, 
peripheral manufacturers, and consumers benefit from this relative stability. 
Without creating entirely new code, programmers and hardware companies can 
create new products and services based on an operating system’s functions.202 
Customers can customize and/or add more capabilities to their computing 
devices by purchasing these new items.203 A lack of stability in an operating 
systems programs and hardware can constrain the amount of value a software 
platform provides to all of its participants.  
A software platform’s complements are the set of applications and 
peripherals that are allowed to change at a faster rate than its operating 
system.204 They are new programs and/or devices that provide specialized 
capabilities not present in an operating system.205 In other words, they increase 
a software platform’s capabilities. Additionally, they operate using new code that 
must work with an operating system’s software and hardware in order to 
function.206 This is very advantageous. Application developers and peripheral 
manufacturers can create new products and services without having to develop 
their own operating systems.207 Moreover, this can significantly increase the 
number of firms creating new software platform products and services.208  
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Interfaces are programs and devices that allow a software platform’s 
operating systems and complements to operate with each other.209 Operating 
system and compliment owners can develop their own interfaces. The benefit of 
interfaces is that they can make the elements software platform 
interchangeable.210 That is, they allow for operating systems and complements 
to change without undermining the platform’s performance.211 In addition, they 
can increase the opportunities for the new platform innovations. Programmers 
and hardware manufacturers can use the existing code of operating systems 
and/or complements as the foundation for new products or services.212 
Specifically, they do not have to write a significant amount of new code. 
Interfaces like computer operating systems tend not to change because they 
allow innovation to occur while maintaining the software platform’s functions and 
design.213  
The interactions between a software platform’s core, complement, and 
interfaces play a major role in the scale and scope of its use. Stable operating 
systems and interfaces allow platform and compliment owners to easily reuse 
and bundle code.214 This provides them with the ability to increase the scale of a 
platform’s use by lowering prices to attract new customers.215 Moreover, as a 
result of this customer increase, computer programmers and hardware 
manufacturers may decide to participate in a software platform’s market.216 They 
can increase a platform’s scope by creating new products and services that add 
capabilities. This in turn can creates a positive feedback loop—new platform 
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customers can attract new application developers and hardware firms to a 
platform, which can result in new product and services.217  
B. GPS AS A SOFTWARE PLATFORM  
The software platform conceptual lens provides a limited explanation of 
how GPS operates as a commercial technology. The U.S. has chosen to operate 
GPS as an open platform; there are no “major restrictions of its development, 
commercialization or use.”218 U.S. laws and policies are designed to maximize 
GPS’s commercial use. Furthermore, America provides GPS’s civil signals and 
technical specifications free of charge.219 However, the U.S. has chosen not to 
govern GPS commercial software platform. Instead, America operates and 
maintains GPS and its augmentation systems as a federally-owned navigation 
platform that others can use for public and private purposes.  
1. GPS: A Navigation Operating System  
GPS’s signals, receiver software, satellite constellations, and ground 
infrastructure serve as an operating system to an American navigation platform. 
Together, these elements provide GPS users with the capability to determine 
precise time and to estimate their location, course, speed, and altitude.220 
Moreover, they serve as the foundation of America’s navigation platform.  
Broadly considered, the stable set of programs of GPS’s operating system 
consists of its satellite signals and receiver software. Every specific type of GPS 
navigation signal has its own format for the time and navigation data it 
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contains.221 Each signal can be considered software because it contains 
instructions and data, which a GPS receiver uses to process it.222 Furthermore, 
each GPS receiver contains software, allowing it to recognize, digitize, and 
transform these signals into navigation information.223 GPS receivers cannot 
operate if these signals change or if they do not have the internal software to 
recognize and process them.  
Satellites and ground facilities make up the stable set of hardware of 
GPS’s operating system. This combination of infrastructure is designed to 
produce the information and signals GPS receivers need to operate. Every GPS 
satellite flies in a specific orbit, broadcasts a specific set of navigation signals, 
and has a service life between 7.5 and 15 years.224 Moreover, GPS’s terrestrial 
facilities collect and provide the data and information necessary to support the 
production and broadcast of the existing set of navigation signals.225 Existing 
GPS receivers are designed to operate without the current set of satellite signals 
and their supporting ground infrastructure.  
From a software platform perspective, the U.S. has improved GPS’s 
service by adding new software and hardware. It has specifically added more 
signals and ground infrastructure than what is required for the system to operate. 
This approach is beneficial because it maintains GPS’s backward and forward 
capability and compatibility. Receivers and processes relying on an older set of 
civil signals can continue to operate in their normal fashion. However, their 
resilience and vulnerabilities do not change because they are not designed to 
use these newer signals. However, new devices and services that make use of 
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older and newer signals can significantly increase their performance and 
resiliency. For this to happen, manufacturers and software developers would 
have to develop these products and services and consumers would have to 
purchase them.  
2. GPS Augmentations As Navigation Platform Complements  
The U.S. government operates three domestic augmentation systems and 
participates in two international augmentation consortiums. These augmentation 
systems like a software platform’s compliments consist of programs and 
hardware to extend how GPS is used. They provide signal corrections that make 
GPS’s civil signal’s suitable for applications, such as commercial aviation, which 
requires precise navigation. Furthermore, they require an operating system’s 
general functions to operate.  
America’s augmentations systems have software, signals, and other 
processes that depend on GPS signals. They each operate in a similar manner 
and evaluate how well a precisely located receiver estimates its position using 
GPS’s signals.226 From this comparison, the augmentation systems develop a 
set of signal corrections that are broadcasted to their users, provided on the 
internet, or shared by other means.227 Each augmentation relies on software to 
perform these functions, and each of these systems supports a different GPS 
receiver. 
These augmentations have infrastructures that can vary like a software 
platform compliment’s hardware. The Wide Area Augmentation system has 
satellites and ground stations, which provide GPS signal corrections for civil 
aviation,228 While the Nationwide Differential Global Positioning and 
Continuously Operation Reference Stations Network have terrestrial radio sites, 
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which monitor GPS broadcasts and provide signal corrections for marine and 
surface users.229 The International Global Navigation Satellite Service consists of 
satellite signal monitoring stations operated by organizations around the 
world.230 Similarly, the Global Differential GPS system consists of sophisticated 
GPS receivers located across the world.231  
C. THE SOFTWARE PLATFORM LENS AND GPS’S CRITICALITY, 
RESILIENCE, AND VULNERABILITY  
The U.S. government does not actively govern and operate GPS like a 
software platform. Instead, it operates GPS and its augmentation system like a 
computer operating system. To maintain and improve GPS’s performance, it has 
also added new civil signals. In the short run, this approach does not change the 
nature of GPS’s criticality, resilience, and vulnerability, though it might do so over 
time. 
Through the addition of civil signals, the U.S. has transformed GPS into 
the functional equivalent of multiple satellite navigation systems. Each new set of 
signals increases its navigation accuracy and reliability by increasing the number 
of ways a GPS user can obtain time and calculate position, course, and speed. 
Every individual signal becomes less critical because there are more available for 
use. However, to receive these benefits GPS users must employ receivers that 
use multiple sets of signals. This is a somewhat uncertain outcome because 
manufacturers, application developers, and consumers do not have to choose 
these new signals. Furthermore, these signals do not change how GPS operates.  
Multiple sets of signals provide the U.S. the opportunity to use market 
segmentation to improve the overall resilience of the population of GPS users. 
Each set of civil GPS signals provides its users with an inherent level of 
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resiliency. Through either cooperative efforts or regulation, the U.S. can develop 
receiver standards based on the criticality for the activity for which a GPS 
receiver is being used. This could help the U.S. make sure that critical economic 







The United States considers GPS a critical element of “national security, 
economic growth, transportation safety, and an essential element the worldwide 
economic infrastructure.”232 It provides vital timing and navigation signals to the 
U.S. military, allied armed forces, critical infrastructures, and vital economic 
sectors across the world. An interruption of GPS’s operation could result in 
military setbacks, economic losses, accidents, and the loss of life and property.  
To prevent these outcomes, the U.S. has made GPS extremely resilient to 
disruption. It flies more satellites than required, broadcasts multiple signals, and 
has added significant ground infrastructure to the GPS system.233 Despite this, 
the president, Congress, federal agencies, and others have expressed concerns 
that there is a need for additional GPS backups. This raises the questions of: 
Why? And should more be done to address GPS’s vulnerabilities? 
The two lenses applied in Chapters IV and V focus on different aspects of 
the roles GPS fulfills as a global satellite navigation system. As a public utility, 
GPS is a physical infrastructure that produces and delivers critical navigation 
timing and signals to its users.234 By contrast, as a software platform lens, GPS 
is an operating system that serves as foundation for navigation and timing 
applications.235 These conceptual lenses represent two different but 
complementary characterizations of the GPS system. Each provides a different 
perspective on how GPS’s most salient characteristics influence its operations, 
vulnerabilities, and the strategies used to protect it. Together, they provide us 
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with broader insights on the nature of GPS’s criticality, resilience, and 
vulnerability.  
A. ANALYSIS  
The U.S. has pursued two distinct strategies to address specific aspects of 
GPS vulnerabilities; together, they reveal that the U.S. has increased GPS 
resiliency by reducing the criticality of all of its major elements. The public utility 
lens suggests the U.S. has reduced GPS’s vulnerability to service interruptions 
through system design and physical redundancies. The U.S. has designed 
GPS’s operations so that every element in its ground and space infrastructure 
contributes the global production and delivery of GPS signals. In other words, 
these facilities outputs are not limited solely to the region in which they are 
located. This design approach creates redundancies in the GPS system as 
multiple ground facilities and satellites perform the same operational functions. 
Moreover, the U.S. has further increased GPS’s resilience by increasing the 
number of GPS ground facilities and satellites. By doing this, the U.S. has added 
more redundancies to the GPS’s infrastructure. System design and redundancies 
reduce the likelihood infrastructure failures will prevent GPS from providing its 
users with signals.  
The software platform lens indicates America has decreased GPS’s 
vulnerability by increasing the number of signals (e.g., computer code) in its 
operations. It has implemented this approach by increasing the amount of 
satellites in the GPS constellation. All GPS satellites broadcast a common set of 
signals. Furthermore, each new GPS satellite generation broadcasts a new set of 
set of signals in addition those of older generations. This means that the addition 
of new satellites to the GPS constellation automatically increases number and 
types of signals that are available for navigation. In others words, the GPS 
system has created redundancies in its signals. In the event that individual 
signals or set of signals is disrupted, GPS receivers have other broadcasts they 
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can use to determine time or estimate their position, course, speed, and location. 
This assumes these receivers have the capability to use these newer signals.  
Collectively, the public utility and software platform lenses suggest that 
manufacturers, programmers and end users are the major constraints in the U.S. 
approach to addressing GPS’s vulnerabilities. Generally speaking, existing GPS 
devices are not reprogrammable and are only compatible with the satellites and 
signals that existed at the time they were manufactured. As a result, older GPS 
receivers and the processes that relying on them do not necessarily benefit from 
the addition of new satellite and signals. That is, they maintain their existing level 
of performance and vulnerability unless replaced with receivers that can use 
these newer signals. This means that the U.S. approach to improving GPS 
resilience depends on manufacturer and software programmer developing 
products and services that utilize GPS’s older and new signals. Furthermore, 
consumers would have to purchase these new innovations. 
B. FINDING AND LIMITATIONS 
There are two major shortcomings with the GPS research literature that 
limit the findings of this thesis. One, the social science and policy research 
communities have not made GPS a focus of sustained, theory-based research. 
Two, the U.S. does not keep official statistics on GPS use. Each of this limitation 
constrains this research in different ways.  
The publicly available GPS literature does not evaluate GPS using 
theoretical concepts from the social sciences. As a result, the literature does not 
provide an in-depth explanation of what factors have made GPS such an 
important technology. Instead, the literature tends to simply describe GPS 
important as a global satellite navigation system. Consequently, there is not one 
overarching theoretical or conceptual framework that has been used to examine 
GPS and its relationship with the political, social, and technical factors that have 
influenced its evolution. Both time constraints and literature shortcomings have 
limited this thesis to a descriptive analysis how GPS conforms to public utility and 
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platform lens. This is a small step toward a better understanding GPS, but more 
research to validate these findings would be beneficial.  
There are no official statistics on the number of GPS devices in use and 
what economic and social activities they are supporting. This limits our ability to 
understand the scope and scale of GPS’s use. In other words, it is not fully 
known how many and what type of GPS devices are currently in operation in 
America. Furthermore, it is also not known what quantities and types of GPS 
devices are being manufactured and sold to U.S. GPS users. These data 
limitations prevent us from having a complete understanding the full extent to 
which current and future users may be vulnerable to GPS service interruptions.  
C. NEXT STEPS 
Social science research should be conducted on GPS to broaden our 
understanding of how military, economic, social factors have influenced its 
technological roles and vulnerabilities. Social construction of technology theory 
(SCOT), which has been used to study bicycle evolution, flood control, and 
nuclear weapons, would provide a useful starting point for this research.236 It 
provides a framework and methodologies to determine how the interaction 
between a technology and groups has influenced how that technology is created, 
used, and improved.237 This means SCOT can provide us with broader insights 
on how economic, political, and social process have shaped how the U.S. has 
designed, operated, and maintained GPS. Moreover, an understanding of the 
process can help the U.S. more effectively understand and addresses GPS 
vulnerabilities.  
                                            
236 Wiebe E. Bijker et al., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions 
in the Sociology and History of Technology, anniversary ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 
11–44; Wiebe E. Bijker, “Why and How Technology Matters,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Contextual Political Analysis, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199270439.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199270439-e-037, 684.   
237 Bijker, “Why and How Technology Matters,” 684–685.  
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The U.S. government or research institution should lead the development 
of data collection systems models and metrics quantifying the number of GPS 
users and their vulnerabilities to interruptions in service. The ongoing U.S. public 
debate on GPS’s vulnerabilities and how to best address them does not include 
numerical analysis. Sustained market research and surveys could provide data 
on number and the types of GPS devices in operation and/or being sold in 
America. Moreover, this data would allow for the development of quantitative 
models and metrics to estimate and track how GPS’s use and vulnerabilities are 
changing over time. Furthermore, these models could help estimate the 
contributions that each major system element makes GPS’s resilience. The 
knowledge and insights gained from this data, models, and metrics could help 
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